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Abstract 
The constitutive activity of the self and the ground of the 
unity of the self are two important aspects of 
understanding the self. This paper attempts to delineate 
these considerations, tracing their use, function and 
implications in Bradley‟s thesis on the self. The article 
argues that for Bradley, the focalization is on the 
understanding of the self and the relation of thought to 
reality. Furthermore, the article attempts to locate 
Bradley‟s account of the self as appearance as a middle 
course between Kant‟s transcendental idealism to Hegel‟s 
speculative idealism to demonstrate the overlaps, 
ruptures, and evolution of the philosophical journey of 
the concept of the self, its nature, and its expressions. 
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Preamble 
Two types of considerations arise in connection to the 
understanding of the unity of the self. One concern pertains to the 
constitutive activity of the self–an insight exemplified by Kant‟s 
doctrine of transcendental unity of apperception. The other relates 
to the question of the ground of the unity of the self. In accordance 
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to the former view, the self possesses an inner organisational 
capacity in terms of which it not only unifies itself, but also 
organises the world of the non-self into a basic unity, essentially the 
unity of the self (Kant, 1993, A 106; Stern, 1990, pp. 17-27).1 Without 
denying the capacity of the self to organise the world of the non-
self into a basic unity, the latter view raises the question as to 
whether the self is its own ground or if the self is not self-
grounding. This raises a pertinent concern: what the unity of the 
self to be grounded (Snow, 1996). 
These two related issues feature prominently in Bradley‟s account 
of the self. But I argue that Bradley‟s emphasis is on the question of 
the ground of the self and his overall preoccupation is to address 
the dilemma of the relation of thought to reality. This is an issue 
that defines the unfolding of modern philosophy from Kant‟s 
transcendental idealism to Hegel‟s speculative idealism and 
beyond. Bradley‟s account of the „self as appearance‟ is an attempt 
to find a middle position between Kant and Hegel. Understood in 
this sense, it is a sustained critique of modern philosophy while 
paradoxically remaining within what is best in modern philosophy. 
For sake of convenient exposition, we develop our arguments in a 
number of steps. Given the correlation between Bradley‟s doctrine 
of appearance and his solution to the dilemma of thought‟s relation 
to reality, we begin first by examining some relevant aspects of 
Bradley‟s account of the „self as appearance‟. On this basis, we then 
consider Bradley‟s solution to the so-called dilemma of the 
relationship between thought and reality and how this can be read 
as a critique of modern philosophy. We conclude with a brief note 
on Bradley‟s contemporary relevance. The following section, 
therefore, includes a brief consideration of the relevant aspects of 
Bradley‟s doctrine of the „self as appearance‟. 
Bradley’s account of the ‘self as appearance’ 
The topic of the self is recurrent in all of Bradley‟s works. However, 
in Appearance and Reality, it assumes an explicit focus, as Bradley 
devotes two chapters of the work to a consideration of the matter. 
In scrutinising the self, the issue, for Bradley, is not the question of 
the existence of the self. On the contrary, the issue is to determine 
whether there is any justification in the claim that the self is self-
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grounding and the grounds of the world of the non-self. In other 
words, Bradley is interested to determine whether the self is real. 
His interrogation of the meaning of the self has in view the more 
fundamental question of the substantiality of the self. However, 
while Bradley‟s condemnation of the concept of the self might 
appear incoherent in Chapter Nine, that is, it might appear as 
lacking in any definite meaning in the said chapter; it is, 
nevertheless, resolved by the more fundamental condemnation of 
the self as unreal in Chapter Ten. This could be explained by 
considering Bradley‟s view wherein he argues that the inherent 
instability of the concept of the self immediately precludes the 
possibility that the self could be real.  
Thus, from the ontological perspective regarding the substantiality 
of the self, the question of the ground of the unity of the self, that is, 
whether the self is self-grounding becomes fundamental and not 
necessarily, the question of the capacity of the self to organise the 
world of the non-self invoking the self‟s unity. Evidently, the 
question of the capacity of the self to organise the world of the non-
self is important. But, the question that needs to be subsumed 
under the more fundamental question of the ground of the unity of 
the self, if we have to adequately address the question of the reality 
of the self. Indeed, it is against the backdrop of the latter 
consideration that Bradley declares the self as appearance (AR, p. 
104). 
The characterisation is no doubt misleading, for it suggests, 
apparently, that the self is a non-entity. But this is far from 
Bradley‟s intentions, as Bradley does not deny the existence of the 
self. Consequently, we are bound to misunderstand Bradley‟s 
intentions unless we take into account that his use of the concept of 
appearance is distinctive and does involve a “licence”. This is 
clarified in his exposition of the term‟s connotative and metaphoric 
meanings. While Bradley admits that according to the standard 
meaning of the term, “to appear is not possible except to a 
percipient” (AR, p. 430), referring to the idea that the nature of 
appearance will always be understood in terms of its relation to the 
subject, Bradley denies nonetheless, that the standard meaning 
exhausts all the connotation of the term. In the metaphoric sense, in 
which he deploys the term, Bradley points out, “appearance does 
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not always have to appear to a percipient” (AR, p. 430). In this 
sense, appearance simply refers to that which is one-sided and 
passes beyond itself.  
The reference to the one-sided character of appearance and the fact 
that it goes beyond itself indicates that Bradley‟s conceptualisation 
of the essence of appearance implicates the logical distinction 
between a part and a whole. That which is said to be appearance is 
not the whole but a part of the whole in which it exercises its being. 
To the extent that appearance is not the whole but a part of the 
whole, it cannot be said to be original since it derives its meaning 
by being a derivative of the original. Therefore, given the fact that 
appearance is not the whole, the value of appearance cannot be 
determined in isolation but in relation to the whole of which it is a 
part.  
Apart from the fact that appearance is a part and not the whole, 
another hallmark of appearance is its incompleteness. That which is 
said to be appearance is incomplete, since it is not the whole, but a 
part of the whole. Its incompleteness or imperfection is signified by 
the inner contradiction that infects its being, the fact that there is no 
harmonious co-existence between the „that‟ and „what‟, that is, the 
idea‟s existence and content. On Bradley‟s view, anything at all that 
is, so far as it is, has two sides, it has a „what‟ and it has a „that‟. 
Ideally, the two aspects are inseparable, but in „that‟ which is said 
to be appearance, a fundamental discrepancy obtains between both 
considerations (See AR, pp. 320-321). 
Given the instability that infects the being of appearance, the latter 
tends to go beyond itself. Apparently, the trait of self-
transcendence which appearance exhibits expresses its quest for 
completeness which can be satisfied only by that which is other to 
it. This explains why appearance cannot be considered in isolation 
but in relation to its others and indeed the whole, if we must 
understand its true nature (AR, p. 322). 
In view of the clarification of Bradley‟s concept of appearance 
offered above, it now emerges clearly why Bradley characterises 
the self as appearance and what he means by this characterisation. 
To reiterate, like all appearances – acknowledging his distinctive 
deployment of the concept of appearance – the self is a one-sided 
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reality, implying that the self is not the whole of reality, but a part 
of the whole. Similar to other appearances, therefore, there is a 
basic disharmony between the „what‟ of the self and the „that‟ of the 
self, between its content and existence. This leads it to exhibit the 
trait of self-transcendence as a result of the internal contradiction 
that infects its being. The self, according to him, therefore, goes 
beyond itself analogous to other appearances in search of 
completeness.2 In the final analysis, therefore, according to 
Bradley‟s view, the fundamental incompleteness of the self explains 
why it cannot be said to be self-grounding or be called the ultimate 
ground of the entire gamut of the non-self. 
Bradley’s doctrine of appearance and the problem of the relation 
of thought to reality 
It should be evident from our account so far that Bradley‟s doctrine 
of appearance has a wide range of application so far as it is a 
statement regarding the ontology of appearance qua appearance. To 
this extent, it is useful for us to investigate the being of any 
appearance, since the same logic of argument is operative as far as 
the question of delineating the essence of appearance is concerned. 
Indeed, this is what we find to be the case with respect to the 
“realities” (things) that Bradley regards as appearance such as self, 
truth, religion, philosophy, art, feeling, will and thought. We can 
hardly understand the nature of these phenomena from Bradley‟s 
standpoint without taking into account his doctrine of appearance. 
This is particularly true of Bradley‟s account of the essence of 
thought as contained in Chapter Fifteen of AR. Bradley tells us later 
in the appendix that the solution offered here to the so-called 
dilemma of the relation of thought to reality contains the main 
thesis of his magnum opus (AR, p. 320). Yet, it must be emphasised 
that Bradley‟s solution to the dilemma is informed by his doctrine 
of appearance (See AR, pp. 319-320). 
The dilemma and the basic issues it raises 
The basic issue involved in the dilemma concerns how to safeguard 
two legitimate considerations, as far as the question of the nature 
and possibility of knowledge is concerned. On the one hand, the 
assumption is that reality is intelligible otherwise it is impossible 
for thought to objectively qualify reality. Yet, granting the 
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intelligibility of reality, which effectively implies that there is an 
objective correlation between the structure of reality and the 
structure of thought, there is also a requirement that there be a 
moment of difference between thought and reality. Otherwise, the 
transcendence of the object of thought cannot be guaranteed (Cf. 
AR, p. 149 and p. 493). 
 The moment of identity in the relationship between thought and 
reality is as important as the moment of difference between them, if 
we are to guarantee the possibility of objective knowledge of 
reality. Without the moment of identity, we are vulnerable to 
scepticism, for thought cannot cognise reality unless there is an 
objective relation between them. Similarly, without the moment of 
difference, we are vulnerable to subjectivism since it emerges that 
the object of thought is lacking in transcendence, and so is nothing 
but a mere construct of the subject. Thus, the basic challenge that 
the dilemma confronts us with is how to understand the 
relationship between thought and reality so that we could avoid 
the two extremes of subjectivism and scepticism, while securing the 
possibility of objective knowledge (Cf. Stace, 1924, pp. 69-78). 
In addressing the issue, Bradley is keen to safeguard the two 
aspects of the dilemma by maintaining a two-fold thesis. First, that 
reality is immanent in thought and second, that reality is more than 
thought. The immanence of reality in thought satisfies the demand 
of identity between thought and reality as a condition for the 
possibility of knowledge, while the fact that reality is more than 
thought equally satisfies the demand of difference between thought 
and reality as a condition for the possibility of knowledge 
(Ilodigwe, 2005, pp. xx-xxvi). 
The history of philosophy warrants that the issues the dilemma 
raises go back to the very dawn of philosophy. Indeed, in 
addressing the issue, Bradley takes into account the historicity of 
the matter, especially two paradigmatic attempts in modern 
philosophy to resolve the dilemma, namely, Kantianism and 
Hegelianism. In articulating his position in AR, Bradley aims to 
convince the reader that his solution indeed offers an effective 
alternative to the earlier proposed models. As he says in the 
appendix (AR, p. 493), “the solution to the dilemma offered in 
chapter XV, is, I believe the only possible solution...views opposed 
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to that thesis, remaining, it, seems to me, caught in and destroyed 
by the dilemma”. 
Therefore, it becomes important to gain a full conspectus of 
Bradley‟s position, it is important to consider his reception of 
Kantianism and Hegelianism, since he develops his position 
against the backdrop of the perceived limitations of both these 
initiatives. 
Kantianism and the problem of the Thing-in-Itself  
In AR, Bradley appraises the contributions of Kantianism and 
Hegelianism by focusing on two doctrines that respectively expose 
their weakness, namely, the commitment of Kantianism to the 
doctrine of the thing in-itself (Ding an sich) and the commitment of 
Hegelianism to the doctrine of “perfect consciousness.” In 
discussing both doctrines Bradley demonstrates his awareness of 
the dependence of Hegelianism on Kantianism, but he is also 
careful to underscore his dissatisfaction with both doctrines, if 
taken as adequate solutions to the dilemma of the relation between 
thought and reality (AR , p. 493; ETR, pp. 199-201). 
According to Bradley‟s view, the problem with the doctrine of the 
thing-in-itself is that by allowing a dualism to persist in our 
understanding of the subject-object relation, it violates the demand 
that the object of knowledge be immanent in the subject; for if the 
thing-in-itself is wholly other to thought and the object can be 
cognized only as appearance, it remains to be seen how the object 
can be known in its objectivity (Cf. ETR, pp. 112-113). 
What is evident, therefore, is that Bradley is one with Hegelianism 
in rejecting the claim of Kantianism as far as the epistemic status of 
the thing-in-itself is concerned. But a close attention to the overall 
drift of Bradley‟s exposition in AR, Chapter Fifteen suggests that 
Bradley is equally dissatisfied with Hegelianism for invoking the 
doctrine of “perfect consciousness”. To dissolve the Kantian 
doctrine of the thing-in-itself, Hegelianism apparently annuls the 
difference between reality and thought, so that on the Hegelian 
scheme, it becomes difficult to guarantee the transcendence of the 
object of thought (See PL, pp. 588-592). 
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In correcting Hegelianism on the need to affirm the transcendence 
of the object, Bradley demonstrates his understanding of the 
complexity of the issues involved in the dilemma and the fact that 
they do not yield to easy solution. Consequently, while Bradley 
endorses Hegelianism‟s dissolution of the doctrine of the thing in-
itself, he denies that the difference between reality and thought can 
be domesticated by thought for consciousness.3 In other words, he 
insists that beyond the rejection of the Kantian thing in-itself 
doctrine, there is a healthy sense of otherness of the object of 
thought that is a sine qua non for the possibility of knowledge (PL, 
pp. 588-592). 
In maintaining this position, Bradley attempts to steer a middle 
position between Kantianism and Hegelianism by saving the 
double intuition of immanence and transcendence as far as the 
question of the relationship between thought and reality is 
concerned. On the one hand, the immanence of the object in the 
subject means that our knowledge of the object is not independent 
of subjectivity. On the other hand, the transcendence of the object 
means that existence (object) is irreducible to thought (Cf. AR, p. 
431). 
Hegelianism and the problem of perfect consciousness 
Concerning the ambiguities surrounding a proper understanding 
of the nature of the relationship between Bradley‟s rejection of the 
doctrine of the thing in-itself and the theory of perfect 
consciousness, as a moment in the overall search for a solution to 
the dilemma, Bradley clarifies his position by anticipating an 
objection. He says in AR that  
There is an erroneous idea that, if reality is more than 
thought, thought itself is at least quite unable to say so. To 
assert the existence of anything in any sense beyond 
thought suggests to some minds the doctrine of the thing–
in-itself. And of the thing in-itself we know that if it existed, 
we could not know it and again as far as we know it, we 
know that it does not exist. The attempt to apprehend this 
other in succeeding would be suicide and in suicide could 
not reach anything beyond total failure. (AR, p. 147) 
Damian Ilodigwe                     Bradley‟s Account of the Self as Appearance 
9 
 
While the above passage indicates that Bradley is aware of the 
sceptical cul-de-sac of the doctrine of the thing-in-itself, it also 
indicates that Bradley is keen to accentuate a sense of other to 
thought, which is not collapsible into the doctrine of the thing-in-
itself. While the typical Hegelian criticism that is usually directed 
against the thing-in-itself doctrine may be successful otherwise 
(Bradley certainly endorses it), the same criticism will not be 
effective with respect to understanding a clear sense of what is the 
other to thought that is not collapsible into the doctrine of the 
thing-in-itself.  
Since Bradley is aware that a commitment to this healthy sense of 
other to thought can be viewed as a reincarnation of the doctrine of 
the thing-in-itself, Bradley anticipates the objection by denying that 
“our consummation is the thing-in-itself and that it makes thought 
know essentially what is unknowable” (AR, p. 152). On the 
contrary, Bradley insists that the reality of the existence of other to 
thought simply implies that “reality is more than thought” (AR, p. 
143) and as a consequence, thought necessarily fails in the ambition 
to qualify reality without reservation (AR, pp. 319-320). 
With this thesis, Bradley sharpens his criticism of the notion of 
perfect consciousness since it is apparently on this basis that 
Hegelianism refuses to acknowledge the possibility of the other to 
thought, assuming, as it were, that the dialectical resources of 
thought enables thought to domesticate anything other to thought, 
so that in the final analysis nothing can escape the dialectical grasp 
of thought. As a counter point to this view point, while Bradley 
agrees that the sort of dualism that the doctrine of the thing-in-itself 
implicates is unacceptable, Bradley nonetheless maintains that a 
certain notion of duality within consciousness is sustainable and 
cannot be undone in the end. Failing to grant this implies that the 
doctrine of the perfect consciousness is problematic and so cannot 
resolve our dilemma regarding the relation of thought and reality. 
As Bradley makes explicit (AR, p. 148) 
We have seen that anything real has two aspects, existence 
and character; and that thought always must work within 
this distinction. Thought, in its actual processes and results, 
cannot transcend this dualism of the “that” and the “what”. 
I do not mean that in no sense is thought beyond this 
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dualism, or that thought is satisfied with it and has no 
desire for something better. But taking judgement to be 
complete, I mean that in no judgement are the subject and 
predicate the same. In every judgement the genuine subject 
is reality, which goes beyond the predicate and of which the 
predicate is an adjective. And I would urge first, that in 
desiring to transcend this distinction thought is aiming at 
suicide. (AR, p. 148) 
The above passage clarifies the sort of duality that permeates 
between consciousness and its object that Bradley is prepared to 
grant. It also makes clear the sense of dualism Bradley rejects, so 
that Bradley is one with the exponents of the theory of “perfect 
consciousness” in denying that there is other to thought that is 
wholly other to thought, and not a mere auxiliary. Nevertheless, 
Bradley is also keen to insist that by conceding to this point, it does 
not mean that we, consequently, agree to the annulment of the 
difference between thought and its object. In other words, Bradley 
is prepared to grant the basic intuition of dialectical philosophy 
with regard to the legitimate mediation of difference by dialectical 
consciousness (Cf. ETR, pp. 223-224). In the final analysis, Bradley 
nonetheless insists on the irreducibility of existence to thought (AR, 
pp. 149-150). 
Discussion 
Our account of Bradley‟s reception of Kantianism and Hegelianism 
above in terms of the two-fold doctrine of the thing-in-itself and the 
theory of perfect consciousness respectively, shows the overlaps 
and distinctions between Hegel and Bradley. For, while Bradley 
agrees with Hegel in jettisoning the thing-in-itself doctrine, thus 
affirming along with Hegel, the power of dialectical philosophy, 
Bradley nonetheless disagrees with a core principle of Hegelianism, 
namely, the sovereignty of dialectical reason over existence, 
evidenced in the power of reason to mediate all difference, such 
that there could be no other to thought in the end (Cf. AR, p. 26). 
The question of the ambiguity of Bradley’s relation to Hegel  
Hegel‟s unbridled confidence in the power of reason, which 
Bradley fervently disagreed with, led Hegel to famously assert that, 
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“the real is rational and the rational is real” (Hegel, 1967, p. 27). 
Nonetheless, in denying that existence is reducible to thought as a 
counter-point to Hegel‟s unbridled emphasis in the power of 
reason, Bradley accentuates his reservations about Hegelianism, 
thus, indicating his ambiguous relationship with the entire 
tradition of dialectical thinking. While Bradley does not deny the 
identity between thought and reality, what Bradley questions is 
whether the identity could ever be absolute such that there is no 
difference between reality and thought (Mander, 1994, p. 126). 
Commentators often stress on the affinity between Bradley and 
Hegel in an attempt to understand Bradley‟s philosophy. This 
explains why Bradley has often been portrayed as a Hegelian (PL, 
p. x). While the projection is not wholly unfounded, I suggest that 
the divergence between Bradley and Hegel is important and 
perhaps it is an essential key for unlocking what is unique in 
Bradley (Mander, 1994, p. 126; Rescher, 2010). For, once the 
divergence is taken as a “supreme” point of departure in 
interpreting Bradley, Bradley immediately emerges as a foremost 
critic of Hegelian rationalism while paradoxically remaining 
Hegelian, given his residual commitment to the principle of 
subjectivity (Bedell, 1977, pp. 262-290; Candlish, 2007). 
Parallel between Bradley and Schelling: The question of 
moderating the claim of idealism 
With respect to Bradley‟s ambiguous relationship with 
Hegelianism, parallels have been drawn between Bradley and later, 
Schelling. The parallelism is warranted, if we consider that like 
Fichte and Hegel, Schelling began his philosophical expositions by 
adopting the principle of subjectivity as an absolute principle of 
thought and existence, believing, as it were, that such procedure 
was a service to the critical philosophy of Kant which supposedly 
required completion (Snow, 1996; Rockmore, 1993, pp. 72-76). 
Schelling followed intently the Hegelian interpretation of the 
principle of subjectivity - the absolute principle of thought and 
existence, and the broader political and religious implications of the 
interpretive stance. This transformed Schelling from being an 
enthusiast of rationalism to an avowed critic of Hegelian 
rationalism which had become synonymous with the consummate 
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expression of the ideal of rationalistic idealism (Redding, 2010; 
Hedley, 2000, pp. 141-155). It is also reported that following the 
demise of Hegel who had occupied the chair of philosophy in 
Berlin–one of the most important chairs in the entire German 
philosophical world–Schelling was invited to take up the chair in 
Berlin mainly to counter the influence of Hegelian rationalism 
(Hedley, 2000, pp. 141-155). Obviously the question has to be raised 
whether Bradley was influenced by Schelling in any way. For, 
interestingly, the same strategy adopted by Schelling in moderating 
Hegelian rationalism appears to replicate itself in Bradley.  
In the aftermath of his natur philosophie and identity philosophy, for 
Schelling, the question of the ground of the unity of the self, or put 
differently, the unity of the subject-object relation gained primary 
importance. Schelling‟s concern was to determine whether such 
unity can be grounded in the transcendental subject. Negating the 
possibility, he concluded that the principle of subjectivity cannot be 
regarded as an absolute principle of thought and existence, leaving 
us, however, with the question of what might be the ground of the 
unity of the subject-object relation, if it cannot be grounded in the 
subject or object. 
This reminds us of Bradley‟s comparable concerns in his doctrine of 
appearance; though Bradley takes as pre-eminent the question of 
the ground of the unity of the self in interrogating the substantiality 
of the self. Secondly, he also thinks that the fate of the self as a 
“nucleus”, “a fixed point” around which the many converge is 
largely dependent on the question of the substantiality of the self 
(AR, pp. 89-104). In a manner that again reminds us of Schelling, 
Bradley argues that the self or thought is not original, implying that 
it is no more than “mere appearance”. To this extent, it cannot be 
the ground of itself nor could it serve as the ultimate ground of the 
many (CE, pp. 205-206; AR, p. 146; Vaysse, 2000, pp. 17-34). 
As should be evident from our account of Bradley‟s doctrine of 
appearance, the question of the originality of thought, or, again, the 
question of whether the self is its own ground or not, belongs to the 
single enterprise of Bradley‟s attempt to moderate the excesses of 
rationalistic idealism. Given that Bradley understand that thought 
is not sovereign, he did not ground the unity of thought in the self 
or the object, but in the unity of the absolute-mediated, as it were, 
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through the unity of immediate experience. Bradley elaborates in 
Essays on Truth and Reality, the import of his doctrine of immediate 
experience for his philosophic system: 
That on which my view rests is the immediate unity which 
comes in feeling, and in a sense, this unity is ultimate. You 
have here a whole which at the same time is each and all its 
parts and you have parts of which makes a difference to all 
the rest of the whole. This unity is not ultimate if that means 
that we are forced to transcend it. But it is ultimate in the 
sense that no relational thinking can reconstitute it, and 
again in the sense that no relational thinking can ever get 
free from the use of it. And immediate unity of one and 
many at a higher remove is the ultimate goal of our 
knowledge and every endeavour. (ETR, p. 231) 
Immediate experience and the question of moderating the 
claim of idealism 
From the above passage it emerges that for Bradley, immediate 
experience is the foundation and ground of all relational 
experience, of which the self and thought are exemplifications 
(Bradley, 1996, pp. 128-147). If Bradley insists against the excesses 
of rationalistic idealism that existence is irreducible to thought, the 
thesis is ultimately predicated on the correlation established 
between relational experience and immediate experience such that 
in being the ground of thought, thought cannot reconstitute the 
unity of immediate experience, so that in the end, a difference 
always persists between thought and reality as mediated by 
immediate experience (Ilodigwe, 2005, pp. 603-620).4  
Bradley affirms this point again in Essays on Truth and Reality when 
he says 
Immediate experience is not a stage which may or may not 
at some time have been there and now ceased to exist. It is 
not in any case removed by the presence of a not-self and of 
relational consciousness. All that is thus removed is at the 
most; we may say the mereness of immediacy. Every 
distinction and relation still rests on an immediate 
background of which we are aware and every distinction 
and relation (so far as experienced) is also felt, and felt in a 
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sense to belong to an immediate totality. Thus in all 
experience we still have feeling which is not an object, and 
at all our moments the entirety of what comes to us, 
however much distinguished and relational, is felt as 
comprised within a unity which itself is not relational. (ETR, 
178) 
We should take particular interest in Bradley‟s claim that 
immediate experience is not absolute in the sense that the unity 
which characterises it is not ultimate but mimics the unity of the 
absolute, although concretely realised at a level beyond relational 
experience. To the extent that immediate experience is not absolute, 
it is appearance. But it is appearance of a special kind in the sense 
that it performs the epistemic and ontological functions of 
grounding our knowledge of the reality of things as well as 
connects us to the absolute in the process, so that as far as Bradley‟s 
metaphysical system is concerned, we can speak of a threefold level 
of experience, namely, non-relational, relational and supra-
relational experience (Mander, 1991, pp. 485-498). 
As should be evident from our exposition, Bradley‟s interrogation 
of the substantiality of the self implicates the three levels, for 
beginning with the level of relational experience and given its 
inherent incompleteness as a result of its appearance status, the 
unity of the self is grounded in the unity of immediate experience, 
which in turn points it to the ultimate unity of supra-relational 
experience as its consummation (Cf. AR, p. 493). 
Bradley‟s solution to the dilemma of the relation between thought 
and reality is based on his supra-relational account of the nature of 
ultimate reality. If all relational attempts to qualify reality without 
reservation fail in the end, it is because ultimate reality is supra 
relational and not merely rational, so that even if the “real is 
rational”. Moreover, the rational may not always be real, since 
reality is more than rational (PL, pp. 590-591). 
Conclusion 
In view of our account, it is clear that there are many aspects to 
Bradley. One may choose to emphasise Bradley‟s thesis concerning 
the irreducibility of existence to thought as someone like 
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Kierkegaard or Marcel will do; or one may choose to emphasise 
Bradley‟s celebration of immediate experience as the ground of 
relational experience as someone like Bergson and James will do 
(Ilodigwe, 2010).5 One may also choose to emphasise the point that 
appearance is one-sided and goes beyond itself in search of 
consummation which is guaranteed only by the Absolute. 
Whichever aspect we choose to emphasise, what is clear is that 
Bradley is a transitional figure as far as the history of philosophy is 
concerned, so that the various emphases will yield different 
portraits of his philosophy (Bradley, 1996, pp. 128-147). We drew 
attention to the parallel established between Bradley and Schelling. 
No doubt the parallel feeds upon Bradley‟s thesis concerning the 
irreducibility of existence to thought and when accentuated, it 
yields a portrait of Bradley as a foremost critic of rationalistic 
idealism.  
As is well known following the fall of idealism at the turn of the 
century, several philosophical currents such as phenomenology, 
positivism, existentialism and pragmatism competed to fill up the 
philosophical space presumably vacated by idealism. At the heart 
of these exchanges, which conditioned the birth of contemporary 
philosophy, was the vexed issue of the nature of reason and its 
relationship to reality.  
Apparently, Bradley‟s thesis concerning the irreducibility of 
existence to thought has been appropriated in various ways by 
pragmatism and existentialism in its assault on idealism (Redding, 
2010).6 It is evident that Bradley can be pursued in these directions, 
but it is also important to note that other emphases in Bradley‟s 
thought, such as his doctrine of appearance and his account of the 
absolute as supra-relational, yield a portrait of Bradley as a 
rationalist and a mystic, so that if taken into account they serve as 
counter point to the excesses that have come to be associated with 
existentialism and pragmatism in contemporary philosophy 
(Rogers, 1992, pp. 250-264). It is therefore important for us to 
consider the various strands of argumentation and metaphysical 
truths that he ascribed to in order to construct a comprehensive 
understanding of his philosophical treatise. 
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1 The following abbreviations are used in the text to designate Bradley‟s 
works: AR=Appearance and Reality, PL=Principles of Logic, ETR=Essays on 
Truth and Reality and CE=Collected Essays. 
2 Cf. AR, 320 
3 Ibid. 
4 A pragmatist like William James will certainly agree with Bradley on this 
point. But Bradley is nonetheless aware of his divergence from James as 
far as the whole question of his relationship with Kantianism and 
Hegelianism is concerned as should be evident from Bradley‟s “Bradley or 
Bergson?” Journal of Philosophy 7, 1910:29-33, a disclaimer, which Bradley 
issued to address James‟s misinterpretation of his doctrine of immediate 
experience. For a detailed commentary on Bradley‟s disclaimer  
5 For an account of the relation between Bergson and James in respect of 
the correlation between the question of the nature of immediate 
experience, pragmatism and metaphysics, see Ilodigwe (2010). 
6 The question whether Bradley read Schelling or was influenced by 
Schelling is difficult to answer because Bradley often does not mention 
names. So the best we can do is to speculate about what is really the case. 
Nonetheless, it is not unlikely that Bradley was aware of Schelling‟s later 
philosophy and probably drew some inspiration from Schelling‟s criticism 
of Hegel. Indeed, there would be a basis for linking later Schelling and 
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Bradley, since like Schelling, a core element in Bradley‟s metaphysics is 
that existence is irreducible to thought, the same thematic that 
existentialism develops in various ways as the philosophies of Heidegger 
and Ponty indicate. 
 
